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PROFESSOR A YER'S HONEST GHOST 
by 
JUSTUS HARTNACK 
Professor Ayer believes there are three theses in the Concept of 
�find: A strong thesis. a weaker thes is, and a still weaker thesis. The 
strong thesis Ayer takes to be untenable and a thesis which Ryle may not 
wish to hold. The second and weaker thesis is the one that Ayer finds of 
most intere st and which, as he puts it ,  yields a substantial result. The 
third thesis. the weakest one. is, in Ayer's words, ·'Too weak to be of 
very much interest· · .  And as it is not a thesis which Ryle would like to 
identify himself with, I shall not examine it, or examine Ayer·s examin­
ation of it. Nor shal1 I examine the weaker one, i.e. the thesis that, al­
though there may be inner mental processes. these are, at least not al­
ways, what the mental predicates apply to. The strong thesis may be 
difficult, or even impossible, to defend. Nevertheless, it is the one I 
shall concentrate on. Because even though it may be erroneous. it is a 
thesis of great philosophic interest; it is therefore important to try the 
validity of the arguments Ayer is bringing forth agamst it. 
The strong thesis holds that, as Ayer puts it, "that all our talk 
about the mind is translatable into talk about behavior". I am not sure , 
however, that this is a correct description o f  what Ryle is maintaining. 
What I am unhappy about is the concept of translation. In order to say 
that one sentence is translated into another sentence or sentences, it 
must be the case that the two sentenc es. or class of sentences, have the 
same truth-conditions . But if I say that Jones is vain, there is no possi­
bility, according to Ryle's analysis. of translating the sentence ·Jones 
is vain' into a finite number of sentences. There is an infinite number o f  
sentences none a which i s  either a necessary or a sufficient condition 
for the truth of the translated sentence. 
To say that Jones is vain. is not to say that he is doing or saying 
anything, but is to say that he is disposed or inclined to say and do 
certain things. Now, the things he is inclined to do and say are indeed 
not specifiable. What Jones is inclined to say or do depends of course 
upon the situation: it is. furthermore, determined by the fact that he iS 
Jones and not Smith. Smith, who also is vain, may be considerably more 
sophisticated and may not be inclined to say and do what Jones in the 
very same situation would be inclined to say and do. The concept of 
transahility, therefore, is a concept which it is logically impossible to 
apply to Ryle 's Conu1pt of Minrl. 
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However , be that as it may. for Ayer's arguments it is a small point 
and a point <Jn which, I am sure he does not wish to insist. In arguing 
against the strong thesis, Ayer does indeed put his finger on some of the 
sore spots in The Concept of Mind. However, in some of the cases, he 
does not quite distinguish what ought to be distinguished, and in some 
other cases he seemed not to be fair to Ryle's arguments. 
When Ayer describes Ryle's strong thesis by saying: "In the version 
of the programme which we might attribute to Ryle. what would remain 
would be a set of dispositional statements about people's overt behav· 
iour' ' ,  the term 'overt' is an unhappy term, but it is a term which Ayer 
uses to justify part of his criticism. To the best of my knowledge, Ryle 
does not use this term anywhere in the sense in which Ayer takes it. The 
term 'overt' in this sense would have meaning only under the presup· 
position that the term ' inner' would have meaning. The Cartesian thesis, 
which Ryle is attacking, is using the terms 'inner processes ' ,  and 'inner 
occurrences' to mean processes and occurrences in an unextended sub­
stance. This is what one could call a metaphysical sense of the term 
'inner' . Since , according to Ryle , this is a logical howler, there can be 
given no sense to that term - from which it follows that there can be 
given no sense to the term 'outer· either. There is another sense of 
'outer' , however, which is not a metaphysical sense but an ordinary 
language sense. According to this sense, what is outer is either on the 
surface of my body or outside it, and what is inside my body is what is 
inner. But in this sense of · overt' or 'outer' Ryle does not claim that the 
dispositional statements should be about overt behavior. The statements 
I make for instance, be it with my so-called silent voice or with an aud­
ible voice, is neither outer nor inner - it is neither since my statements . 
according to Ryle , cannot be identified with any physiological or anatom­
ical process or any movement of the larynx. Occasiona1ly, he doos use 
tile concepts •overt' and 'covered'. But in these uses the term 'overt' 
has no spatial connotation. It is used to imply that it is neither bidden 
nor private. 
I do not mean to say, however, that Ryle 's strong thesis can be up­
held. In fact, I do agree with Ayer that it cannot. But I do not always 
agree with his arguments against the thesis. Admittedly, when Ryle 
speaks about dreams, day-dreams, visual imaginary, and seeing in the 
mind's eye, the def enders of the strong thesis are confronted with grave 
problems. To be S'1re, Ryle tries to rectify what he calls the logical 
geography of these terms. But it is difficult to see that he has succeed­
ed. It is indeed a well taken argwnent to say, as he does, that to imag­
ine to see, e.g. a bear, is not to see a mental picture of a bear - it is 
not to see at all - it is to picture to see a real bear. Nevertheless, since 
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to picture necessarily must be to picture somethmg and this 'some­
thing' - triviality true - mllst be a picture . it is difficult to be appeas ed 
by it. It is of no help to be told, as Ryle tells us - and correctly so -
that the concept of seeing does not apply to that which I picture. It is of 
no help since it does not ehminate what seems to be a fact, namely, that 
there is a picture. 
On this point, therefore. I agree with Ayer. I am not so sure, how­
ever, that his argument concerning perception-verbs is correct. Ryle 
mentions that perception-verbs are achievement-verbs , and from this 
Ayer concludes that there must have been a preceding activity whose 
purpose it was to achieve that which the achievement verbs are used to 
denote. But is it correct that such activities necessarily precede the 
achievement verbs? In most cases where we use the verb 'to win', it is 
in situations where at least two persons have engaged in some activity. 
But not always. Let us imagine a mother whc tells her two children that 
tomorrow morning she will give a winning prize to the one who is the first 
one to fall asleep after being put to bed. Both children wish very much 
to be the winner. Now compare this situation to a situation wher� the 
two children are engaged in a running match. To win a running match is 
the termination point of an activity - it i� the successful completion of 
it. But in the former situation. it is quite different. The only thing com­
mon to the two children is their wish to be the first one to go to sleep. 
And, of course, no one would want to say that to wish is an activity. 
One of them may have counted sheep; the other one may have tried to 
quote some dull rhymes. or he may have been involved in many other 
activities. But whatever they have done, there is no special activity 
called trying to go to sleep - at least not in the sense in which there is 
an activity such as 'running a race'. 
Or take the verb · to find'. It is true, of course , that 'to find' may 1Je 
to find that which you are looking for, but it does not necessarily have to 
be so. I may also find something without my previous search. I may find 
a dime on the street - I certainly have not been looking for it. Or some­
body may 3.sk me to look fo1· his glasses. The moment I direct my atten­
tion to the task. at that very sane moment I find the glasses • .In such 
situations it would not be correct to say that the achievement of ftnding 
was preceded by an activity directed toward the finding of that which one 
wants to find. Thus. there is nothing which forces us to arrive at the 
embarrassing conclusion that if perception-verbs are achievement-verbs 
then there must be a preceding mental activity - an activity ending with 
the achievement of having seen whatever is in fact seen. If it is argued 
that the very meaning of the verb 'to achieve' entails a preceding activ­
ity, the purpose of which has been accomplished, the answer is rather 
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simple : if this is so it follows that the verb 'to achieve' is not the right 
way to characterize such verbs. The philosophically important point is 
that the perception-verbs are not used to clenote any mental process. And 
if the verb 'to achieve' has consequenc e s  which may mislead us. we 
betr.er find another verb. 
Ayer is also doubtful about the validity of Ryle's attack on privacy. 
I shall not here exami11e the difficult problem of finding out how much of 
our concept of privacy is a matter of logical grammar and how much, in 
one sense or another. is metaphysical. I just want to examine one of 
Ayer' s arguments against the thesis that the questi011 of privacy is re­
ducible to a question of logical grammar. Ayer's point is that if what 
Ryle says about sensation is correct then it must be also correct for 
perception. And surely, so Ayer maintains, Ryle would not wish to deny 
that we observe or witness what we see. This seems to be a statement 
worthwhile investigating. First of all: What do we see? The question is 
not meant. as an empirical question but as a category-question. Or to ex­
press it differently: What is the logical character of the sentence or sen­
tences constituting answers to that question? It has been thought that 
tre an�wer mus{ be one of two possibilities: Eitner the sentences must 
be the so-called M-sentences, i.e. sentences containing names of materi­
al objects; or S-sentences, i.e. sentences containing names of sense-data. 
I do not think that this is correct. My answer to the q_uestion: "What do 
v.e see? ''  is neither to mention a material object nor to mention sense­
data but is to state that something is the case. I may answer that I see 
that the cat is on the mat, or that the animal on the mat is the cat. Ad­
mittedly I may also, in an appropriate situation, say that I see e.g. an 
airplane, or that I see something bluish on the wall. But, as Kant was 
eager to emphasize, I surely cannot see something as, say, an airplane, 
or as something bluish unless I possess and employ the concept of air­
plane and the concept of color and of blue . And to employ a concept is, 
as Kant a.lso emphasiz;ed, to pass a judgment. In other words, the atoms 
of consciousness are judgments: and this is so independently of whether 
we speak about being conscious in terms of being aware of something, 
taking notice of something, paying heed to something, etc. If this is so -
and the time allotted to me does not permit me to argue further for it - it 
follow5 that it is difficult to give a sense to the statement that we wit­
ness or observe what we see. The verb ' lo observe' is sometimes used 
synonymously with the verb 'to see ' .  If I say that I observe that tl1e cat 
is on the mat, it does not mean anything different from saying that I see 
that the cat is on the mat. Sometimes, however, it is used in the sense 
of holding something under observation. ln this sense of the verb I am 
engaged in a process - it is something I do for a shorter or longer period. 
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The psychiatrist may rhink it of importance to observe the patient's be­
havior by talking to him. The psychiatrist 1s seeing many things. He is 
seemg the patient making a certain gnmace: but what he is holding under 
observation is not the grimace but the person making it. It would not be 
correct to say that the psychiatrist is observing what he sees. Or take 
the sailor who watches the horizon or holds it under observation in order 
to find out when he can see land. If asked what he sees, he may truth­
fully say that he sees nothing. If somebody rejects his answer and tells 
him that he must have seen the horizon, he may answer that he holds the 
horizon under observation in order to discover when he can see land -
and so far he has not seen anything. Should it be objected that he cannot 
hold the horizon under observation unless he does see it, the answer is. 
1 suppose . both yes and no. If I am asked to see what a certain box con­
tains, and after having opened it discover that it is empty, it would be 
perfectly correct to say that I saw nothing; it would be beside the point 
if my statement was rejected oo the grounds that I must have seen e.g. 
the inside of the box. In other words. the verb 'to see' and the verb 'to 
observe · - in the latter mentioned sense of' that verb - require accusa­
tives which belong to different logical categories. 
This is also true of the verb 'to witness'. I cannot hold a car acci­
dent under observation but I can witness it. And what I witness I must 
also see; but not all that I see do I witness. I see that the cigar box is 
empty but I do not witness it. I witness events, but that the cigar box is 
empty is not a n  event. 
While l think it is correct to maintain that the verb 'to see' does not 
imply a ghost, the question is more complicated when we deal with such 
process-verbs as 'to watch', and 'to hold wider observation ' .  What I see . 
in the sense of 'to see' in which human beings are said to be able to see. 
is a mental act but not a process: but to watch and to hold under obser­
vation are mental processes. In what sense and to what degree - if any -
it implies a ghost I shall remark about in connection with my discussion 
about thinking. 
I am not quite sure about Ayer's position about thinking. In mention­
ing the weaker thesis. i.e. the thesis that logical behaviorism gives a 
correct account of a great deal of what is ordinarily classified as talk 
about the mind, Ayer maintains that it may apply to thoughts when they 
are overtly expressed. l have the impression that Ayer, somewhat like 
Ryle , thmks there are two possibilities: Either the thought is the sen­
tence when the latter is overtly expressed, or the thought is the sentence 
I rw1 through i11· my head before I utter it. Ryle maintains that the thjnk­
ing is identtcal with what I say independent of whether it is with my 
inner silent voice or whether it is with an audible voice . According to 
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Ryle, it i s  a logical error to assume that the thought could not be identi­
fied with, e.g. the overtly expressed sentence but has to be identified 
with an inner ghostly process. Ayer seems to think that sometimes, al­
though not always, there is a silent thought before the overtly expressed 
thought. However. what Ayer means by inner silent thought is not, so I 
believe, what Ryle means when he speaks of the inner planning - the 
inner ghostly planning. It may in fact be what Ryle is talking about when 
he speaks of the non-ghostly silent talk - which is not more ghostly as, 
say, my whispering of a sentence. If this is so, there seems to be no 
difference between Ryle and Ayer on this point. Be this as it may, I be­
lieve the concept of thinking to be much more complicated than it is 
suggested if one says that the overtly expressed sentence - the sentence 
not preceded by an inner planning - constitutes the thought. A thought is 
identical neither with the sentence , be it expressed silently or audibly, 
nor with any inner silent ghostly process. Against Ryle , and also pos­
sibly against Ayer, although I am not certain about his view on this 
point, I shall ma1ntain that the utterance of the sentence presupposes the 
the thought. A sentence expresses a thought but is not identical with it. 
When I utter a sentence I already know what I am going to say. I do not 
learn it by listening to my own utterance. Suppose I wonder what day of 
the month next Tuesday is. As I happen t-0 know that today is Thursday, 
fray 14. I conclude that next Tuesday is the 19th. What psychologically 
happened may be something like this: I added seven to fourteen and sub­
tracted two and thereby arrived at the number nineteen. However, this 
makes sense only because I know that there are seven days in a week 
and I know that Tuesday is two days before Thursday. But this certainly 
was not part of what happened psychologically. Nevertheless, the two 
propositions (the proposition that there are seven days in a week and the 
proposition that Tuesday is two days before Thursday) constitute part of 
my knowledge and a knowledge which is a necessary condition for the 
validity of the result. It is a condition for the validity and not a psycho­
logical cause. But although it is not a psychological occurrence, it is 
nevertheless something I know. However. to know something is not a 
psychological occurrence . For most of my life. I have known that there are 
seven days in a week and that Tuesday is two days before Thursday. But 
I have not spent most or my life expressing that knowledge. To know 
these propositions is, among other things , to be able to make assertions 
which are justifiable by them. It is to be able to formulate them if needed 
and requested. It is what makes the proposition that it is the nineteenth, 
something which I do not learn by the stating of it. but makes it some· 
thing I know while stating it. If I want to make explicit the validity or 
justification of an assertion 1 may write down all the premises and pre-
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suppositions from which it follows. But quite obviously I cannot use such 
terms as ' it  follows' and 'therefore ' unless I have already arrived at the 
conclusion. The language which applies to these terms is not a language 
which describes the psychological processes. It is a language which is 
used to write down the logical structure of it and to prove the validity of 
it. 
Or think of the surgeon. While te is operating he knows what te is 
doing. If he should justify or explain each of his acts it would require 
hours of quotations from medical books and journals. 1-£ most certainly 
does not cite all medical theories or principles while he is operating. 
While he is operating the surgeon is not rehears\og his knowledge; he is 
applying it. He is displaying his knowledge in his acts. To the extent 
that his acts are explainable and justifiable by principles and theories 
we may apply the language of thought: we may say that from that specific 
observation he sees or concludes that this or that act is required. Again, 
whenever he formulates or states a cooclusion, it is a conclusion he 
already knows - he knows it as an instance of applied knowledge. To 
characterize it as applied knowledge implie s, among other things, that 
while he is performing the act he can at any moment, if needed or re­
quested. explain or justify the act. His knowledge is his reason (but of 
course not the cause) for it. A reason, in this sense, is not an act occur­
ring prior to the act for which it serves as a 1-eason. It is not an act but 
is the principles, theories, hypotheses, etc. which validate, explain, or 
justify it. 
The fact that we know what we say while we say it makes it neces­
sary to distinguish between a thought and the expression of the thought. 
A thought, therefore. is an act which is different from the act of stating 
that thought- I can state a conclusion or state a rejection of an assertion 
in English or French; I can state it in a form which is grammatically 
correct or incorrect, etc., but I cannot conclude in a form which is either 
English or French, or grammatically correct or incorrect. This does not 
mean, however, that I perform two acts, thought-acts and the act of stat­
ing the thoughts. If there were two acts it would be conceivable that 1 
could perform one without the other. But it would make no sense to talk 
about thoughts which were not expressed or f orrnulated. It' they were not 
expressed in language , I would not know that I had them. They would not 
be part oi my c0nsciousness. It should consequently make sense, which 
it obvim1sly does not, to maintain that I may have many thoughts of which 
I would not have the slightest knowledge . But to deny that thoughts 
necessarily constitute elements of consciousness is to eliminate an 
essential part of the meaning of the concept of thought. What then is lhe 
relation between a thought and the stating of it? It is necessary to dis-
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tinguish between having a thought and thinking. It may be maintained, 
although a bit trivially, that thinking consists of thoughts. Thinking is 
the stream of thought. But if thinking consists of thoughts which are not 
time-occupying processes, how can thinking be a time-occupying process? 
The clue to the answer is that the thought has to be formulated or ex­
pressed: and while it does not take time to draw a conclusion or to ques­
tion an assertion. it is a time-occupying process to formulate or to ex­
press a conclusion or a doubt about an assertion. The thinking process 
may thus be something like this: An assumption which is formula.ten as a 
proposition p succeeded by the rejection of p. The rejection is expressed 
in the proposition q and so forth. While to assume, to reject, to doubt. or 
t.o guess, is to have assumed, to have rejected, to have doubted, or to 
have guessed. this is not the case with respect to the stating of our 
assumptions, doubts, or guesses. The stating of an assumption is not to 
have stated it. I can be interrupted in the middle of stating an assumption 
but I cannot be interrupted in the middle of doubting. Expressed in a 
simplified way: to get an idea is to have got it, but to state an idea is 
not to have stated it. 
My view about thoughts are therefore that they are not identical with 
any sentences - be they spoken with an inner silent voice or with an 
audible voice . Thoughts are instances of applications of knowledge. 
They are mental acts but they are not mental processes; consequently , 
they do not belong to the category of which it makes sense to say that 
they are either inner or outer. 
Let me sum up my response to Professor Ayer's paper. l agree with 
him that Ryle's strong thesis cannot hold. I do not a.lways agree, how­
ever, witth Ayer's arguments for rejecting Ryle's strong thesis. Further­
more, it would have been interesting if Ayer had examined also other 
aspects of Ryle's strong thesis. May I mention such concepts as 'making 
statements' or 'having beliefs'.  It seems obvious . as I have argued else­
where, that neither of these concepts can be regarded as dispositional 
concepts. One reason is that for both of these concepts , the concepts of 
truth and evidence are crucial. And. obviously, truth and evidence belong 
to entirely different categories than does the concept of dispositjon. 
In conclusion , let rre say that it has been extremely interesting to 
read Ayer's argument against Ryle 's ghost - and it has been quite fun to 
try to prick holes in some of his arguments. I am afraid. however . that 
the holes I think I have been able to make are not of any great signifi· 
cance. 
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